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Introduction
Substantial public funds are currently committed to the income
security of the working-age population through such programs as
unemployment insurance, social assistance, and refundable tax
credits. Despite the major commitment ofpublic resources, however,
the eradication of poverty remains an elusive goal.
Admittedly, reducing poverty is only one of the objectives of the
income security system. However, poverty is by far the most pres-
sing issue and, in an environment of increasingly tighter fiscal
resources, there is growing pressure for a better method of targeting
income transfers to alleviate it.
There is widespread dissatisfaction with the current income
security system. Social assistance programs focus on the immediate
problem of income need and do little to encourage self-reliance. The
system does not emphasize training and improving employability,
and the benefit structure discourages work effort and acts as a
"welfare trap." A focus on the non-working poor and the neglect of
the working poor exacerbate the situation.
Similarly, the current Unemployment Insurance (UI),the costliest
of all the income security programs, has been widely criticized on
the grounds that it
• contributes to an increase in the duration ofunemployment,
• increases the volume of temporary lay-offs,
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• reinforces the concentration of temporary and unstable jobs
in high-unemployment and low-wage regions, and
• provides too generous a subsidy to Canadians whose
labour-force behaviour is characterized by repeated
unstable employment. (Royal Commission on the Economic
Union and Development Prospects for Canada 1985, p. 611)
TheGuaranteed Annual Income Idea
More than 30 years ago, Milton Friedman proposed the wholesale
replacement of existing income security programs with a simple
negative income tax (Friedman 1962, pp. 190-195). Under his
proposal, households with "negative taxable incomes" (incomes below
the level of exemptions and deductions) would pay "negative taxes,"
that is, they would receive subsidies, at a 50 percent rate. For
example, a household of a certain size with exemptions of $8,000
and an income of $6,000 would receive a $1,000 subsidy. The
household with no income at all would receive a $4,000 subsidy.
The latter amount effectively constitutes an income floor, or a mini-
mum guaranteed annual income, for all households of a given size.
Despite the controversial nature of the specifics of his proposal,
the basic concept of a guaranteed annual income (GAl)has received
wide-ranging support across the entire ideological spectrum. No
other contemporary social policy idea has attracted as much atten-
tion or stimulated as much research and intellectual activity. The
GAl idea attracted support because it was viewed as a universal
plan to eradicate poverty; eliminate the welfare trap that penalizes
recipients excessively if they work; redress current inequities toward
the working poor. who are largely ignored by traditional welfare
programs; and simplify what many have long believed is an
unnecessarily complex and expensive administrative system.
During the last 30 years, a variety of schemes has been developed,
studied, and proposed. They range from a wholesale replacement of
most existing income security programs to incremental h nges.
such as earnings supplements to strengthen work in nt lve (HR in
the a of the Aid aux parents pour leurs r v nu. (11' tJ IV III IAP-
P RTJ progr m in u b ).
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Some schemes involve the tax system. The original idea of negative
income taxes and the federal Child Benefit, which is a refundable
tax credit, are two examples. Other schemes, such as the Guaranteed
Income Supplement for those 65 and older, involve a separate ad-
ministration, independent of the income tax system.
Today, the GAl concept implies, not a specific program design,
but certain generic attributes. GAl schemes advocate
• household income as the main determinant of the level of
benefits,
• a gradual reduction of benefits as earnings increase to en-
courage self-sufficiency and ensure that individuals are
better off working than not working, and
• a simple administration, with minimum intrusion into
family affairs and limited or no bureaucratic discretion.
Despite the impressive intellectual activity stimulated by the GAl
idea, only modest progress has been achieved in the policy field.
There are a number of reasons for this: concerns about the cost of
a universal GAlprogram; political reluctance to introduce a wholesale
replacement or radical down-scaling of existing programs, such as
VI; uncertainty about potential work incentive effects on the working
poor not currently on social assistance; and federal-provincial
jurisdictional issues.
However, there is renewed interest in the GAl idea. Increasingly,
it is viewed as a means of rationalizing the current system, dealing
with the fiscal crisis, and reinforcing work incentives and
self-reliance. For example, current proposals by the Ontario
government to "abolish the welfare system as we know it in Onta-
rio" involve GAl concepts (Ontario. Ministry of Community and So-
cial Services 1993, p. 9).
Study Objectives and Outline
This study is a modest attempt to present the GAl concept in
non-t .hnl 1language in order to provide a better appreciation of
rts r( lev 11\('(' 111 th urr nt policy environment. It do s not attempt
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to break new ground in this very extensively researched area, nor
does it attempt to provide a comprehensive review of the voluminous
GAl literature. Instead, the study contains a selective review of key
studies and policy initiatives to reveal the potential and challenges
of the GAl concept. Also, a simple GAl program is outlined, not to
advocate a specific program with all its parameters, but rather, to
illustrate the GAl concept with the aid of a concrete example.
The focus of the study is the working-age, low-income popula-
tion. The elderly population is excluded from the analysis because
there is already a defacto GAl system for those over 65, consisting
of the Old Age Security (OAS) program, the Guaranteed Income
Supplement (GIS), and provincial top-ups (such as the GAlNS
program in Ontario).
First, a profile of the low-income population is presented, with
particular attention paid to volatility of income and employability.
An overview of the main components of the current income mainte-
nance system follows. The main weaknesses of the system and some
recent initiatives to address them are then discussed.
The concept of a GAl is outlined and a selected number of
proposals reviewed. Finally, a simple GAl program is considered,
which includes rough cost estimates and some discussion of a
deficit-neutral implementation strategy involving a reform of the
existing VI program.
Profile of the Working-Age Poor
The strength of the case for a GAldepends crucially on the extent to
which low-income individuals are employable and. therefore, on the
extent to which they can be encouraged to become financially more
self-sufficient through a GAl. Here, three particular aspects of the
profile of the working-age poor are considered: the extent of poverty
among them,the degree of volatility of both their income and their
dependency on social assistance, and the ext nt of th tr physical
employability and mploym nt prosp ts.
Income Security Reform. and the Concept of a Guaranteed Annual Income 53
The study findings regarding both the income volatility of the
low-income population and their potential employability strengthen
the case for a GAl. They demonstrate that there is great potential
for encouraging self-sufficiency among social assistance recipients.
Furthermore, they show that the population that could benefit from
work incentives is not simply those currently on social assistance,
but a much broader group at risk of requiring social assistance.
In this section, the following aspects of the study are discussed:
• the definition of poverty lines and the Survey of Consumer
Finances, which is the main source of data,
• estimates of the extent of poverty among the working-age
population,
• the volatility of both low-income status and reliance on
social assistance,
• evidence of the physical employability of the low-income
population,
• the marketability of the skills of the low-income popula-
tion,and
• the main conclusions and the key implications in favour of
a GAl program.
Technical Background
Poverty Lines
The definition of poverty lines is a controversial issue. For this
analysis, the poor population has been defined according to the
Statistics Canada Low-Income Cut-Off (LICO)lines (Table 1). The
LICOs are bas d on household expenditure patterns in 1986 and
have b en djust d to 1990, that is, to the cost of living escalation
in 1 . , tntlHt I.s an da has not endorsed the LICOsas poverty
IJn , ; the II (' \I. ('c1 1\(,1'(' onl to id ntify low-in om family units
on 1. t ud tll('lI pi nlll: .
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Table 1
Statistics Canada's Low-Income Cut-Ofts for 1990
Community Size
Household Cities of 100,000- 30,000- Less than Rural
size 500,000+ 499,999 99,999 30,000 areas
1 $14,155 $12,433 $12,146 $11,072 $9,637
2 19,187 16,854 16,464 15,008 13,064
3 24,389 21,421 20,926 19,076 16,605
4 28,081 24,662 24,094 21,964 19,117
5 30,680 26,946 26,324 23,997 20,887
6 33,303 29,248 28,573 26,047 22,672
7+ 35,818 31,460 30,734 28,017 24,385
NOTE Based on household expenditure patterns in 1986 and adjusted for cost of living increases
to 1990.
SOURCE National Council of Welfare, Poverty Profile, 1980-1990, Autumn 1992.
The Survey of Consumer Finances
The analysis of the extent of poverty and the characteristics of poor
family units relies extensively on the 1990 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances (SCF). In the final section, the same database is used to
simulate the implications of an alternative GAl plan.
The SCF, an annual household survey, is the most comprehensive
survey ofhousehold characteristics and incomes. It contains detailed
information about the demographic and labour market
characteristics of the adult Canadian population. Most empirical
studies in Canada related to income distribution, poverty, and the
simulation of social programs rely on data from the SCF. The survey
used here was conducted in April 1991 and contains information
about individual incomes in 1990.
The analysis covers single persons - persons not in families -
and census families. The latter are families, living together in the
same dwelling, consisting of either a husband and wife with or
without children who have never married or one parent with one or
more children who have never married. 1 Here, the term family unit
refers to both single persons and families. .
Low-income statu is d fin d u in St 11.('1 s Cnd LI 0 lin
Th fo us of the n lyt t 1. non- ld 1"1yfamily untt A, I.~., 1')1n~1
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persons under the age of 65 and census families with the head and
spouse, if present, under the age of 65.
There is considerable underreporting or non-reporting of
government transfers in the SCF. In particular, there is about 50
percent underreporting of social assistance payments, including
non-reporting. As a result, the incidence of poverty and the magni-
tude of the poverty gap - low-income lines minus actual income -
are overstated by the SCF data, while the number of social assis-
tance recipients is understated. However, although the absolute
estimates may be biased, relative estimates are still reliable. In other
words, while the absolute incidence of poverty is overstated, the
relative incidence of poverty by family unit characteristic is valid.
The Extent of Poverty
According to the SCF data, there were approximately 1.8 million
non-elderly family units (single persons and census families) with
incomes below the Statistics Canada LICOlines in 1990 (Table 2).
This represents approximately 3.5 million individuals.
As indicated, the SCF data estimate can be treated as a measure
of the extent of poverty subject to two qualifications: the definition
of poverty is subjective and the LICO lines have not been officially
endorsed as poverty lines; and the SCF data overstate the extent of
poverty because of underreporting of government transfers.
The incidence of poverty was highest among single mothers (51
percent) followed by single persons (33 percent). However, because
single persons are four times as numerous as single mothers, they
account for over one-half ofall poor family units, while single mothers
account for one-in-five poor family units.
According to the SCF, one-in-three poor family units received
social assistance in 1990. The actual number is considerably higher
because, as mentioned above, there is extensive under- or
non-reportin of social a i tance payments. Assuming the extent
fund rr porttng or non-r p rtin i mor or le uniform across
family unit lu rn tcrl tlr. ,th , 'd t provld n tnt r ting
III 19ht.
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Distribution of Family Units by Income Status
Single persons 100% 10% 23% 33%
Couples/no children 100% 2% 6% 9%
Couples/with children 100% 2% 7% 9%
Single fathers 100% 9% 14% 22%
Single mothers 100% 29% 22% 51%
All family units 100% 7% 13% 20%
Distribution of Income Status by Type of Family Unit
Single persons 32% 46% 57% 53%
Couples/no children 18% 6% 9% 8%
Couples/with children 41% 13% 21% 18%
Single fathers 1% 2% 1% 2%
Single mothers 8% 33% 12% 19%
All family units 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2
Incidence of Low-Income and Social Assistance,
by Type of Family Unit, 1990
All
family units
Low-income
family units
receiving
social
assistance
Number of Family Units by Type of Unit and Income Status
Single persons 2,876,857 277,441
Couples/no children 1,614,223 38,289
Couples/with children 3,683,482 75,665
Single fathers 121,706 10,539
Single mothers 672,791 196,160
All family units 8,969,059 598,094
Low-income
family units
not receiving
social
assistance
All
low-income
family units
665,696
101,139
248,639
16,457
146,221
1,178,152
943,137
139,428
324,304
26,996
342,381
1,776,246
NOTE The term single person refers to individuals not in families, while the term family refers to
census families.
SOURCE Survey of Consumer Finances, 1990 incomes.
Low-income single mothers had the highest incidence of reliance
on social assistance: three-in-five low-income mothers received so-
cial assistance in 1990, The second highest incidence of reliance on
social assistance was among low-income single persons, one in thr
of them recetv d a i t n tngl per on aunt d f r 46 p r-
nt f 11f mtly unit on soctal ststan " fall w d by sing!
mothera who H C'0I11l1( cl for OIl<' In tllrt·(·,
--------===
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Income and Employment Volatility
The low-income population is not static and well-defined. From year
to year. large numbers of family units flow into and out of poverty.
or onto and off social assistance. This is an important observation
from the point of view of designing an effective income security
system. It implies that the objective of income security is not simply
to help a specific population but. also and more important. to affect
in a favourable way the flow of individuals into and out of poverty.
or onto and off social assistance.
There is considerable evidence of the income volatility of the
low-income population. A recent study by the Economic Council of
Canada (1992) provided a unique insight into the income volatility
of the low-income population. In particular. the study showed that
Some 39 percent of those who were in the lowest income quintile
in 1982 had climbed to a higher quintile by 1986. Conversely. 40
percent of those who were in the lowest quintile in 1986 had
dropped down from a higher quintile that they occupied in 1982.
(p.13)
These numbers do not include those who left a quinttle, then
returned to it within the five-year period. In fact. the study found
dramatic changes in family incomes every year throughout this
period.
Similar volatility can be observed with respect to the social assis-
tance population. For example. according to the 1986-87 Labour
Market Activity Survey (LMAS),each year one-third of social assis-
tance recipients leave the system. Underlying this volatility is the
diversity of circumstances of recipients. Some are on social assis-
tance for a short period as a result of a temporary problem. such as
a family break-up. a health problem. or economic recession. Others
are caught in a cycle of low-paying intermittent employment. frequent
dependency on unemployment insurance. and periodic return to
social assistance.
Employability
A prin Ipal rnuonak for 1\ ,AI is to tmpr v w rk tn nttv amon
t lu poor I-l11d (11IlIllI Ill' t lu- ('\11rc'nt "W( lfuro l r p." 1 h( undcrl In'
p1'(1I11 ('I II1 If III lily olllll «llIplo IIhl< p()or 11'('dl ('OIIl'1t ('d r,'oll\
Social
assistance
recipients
Non-social All
assistance low-income
recipients families
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achieving greater self-sufficiency because of work disincentives
present in social assistance programs. The strength of the case for
a GAl. therefore. depends very much on the extent to which the
low-income population is employable.
The evidence suggests that most social assistance recipients are
employable or at least potentially employable; with appropriate trai-
ning. income supplementation. and support services. they can be
successfully integrated into the labour force and eventually become
ftnanctally self-sufficient. The following factors indicate that a large
proportion of social assistance recipients are employable:
• The Classification of Social Assistance Recipients. According
to provincial administrative definitions of employability.
which differ from province to province. about half of social
assistance recipients are classified as employable. However.
this proportion may be higher because the classification
ignores the number of social assistance recipients who could
be integrated into the labour force if appropriate training
and other support services were provided.
• Presence of Earnings. About two-thirds of all low-income
family units had some employment earnings in 1990 (Ta-
ble 3). Among family units receiving social assistance. 3$
percent had some earnings in 1990. a direct indication of
the extent of employability among social assistance
reciptents. Among non-recipient family units. close to 79
percent had some earnings in 1990.
Table 3
Presence of Earnings Among LOW-Income,
Non-Elderly Family Units, 1990
Single persons 30% 76% 62%
Couples /no children 25% 75% 61%
Couples /with children 65% 92% 86%
Single fathers 46% 72% 62%
Single mothers 41% 76% 56%
All family units 38% 79% 65%
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Table 4
Distribution of Heads of Low-Income, Non-Elderly Family Units,
by Work Experience, 1990
Non-social
assistance
recipients
Social
assistance
recipients
All
low-income
units
Worked full-time for 50 weeks or more in 1990 5%
Worked less than 50 weeks or part time in 1990 29%
Last worked in previous 4 years 24%
Last worked more than 5 years ago
or neverworked 43%
28%
51%
9%
20%
43%
14%
12% 22%
All heads of low-income family units 100% 100% 100%
SOURCE Survey of Consumer Finances, 1990 incomes.
• Work Experience of Head of Family Unit. Focusing on the
heads of low-Income, non-elderly family units. the SCF data
show that most individuals either worked in 1990 or had
recent work experience. In particular. over one-third of all
social assistance recipients worked in 1990. while an
additional one-quarter worked in the previous four years
(Table4).Among non-recipients. 80 percent worked in 1990.
Table 5
Distribution of Heads of Low-Income, Non-Elderly Family Units,
by Main Activity While Not WorRing or Looking for Work, 1990
Social Non-social All
assistance assistance low-income
recipients recipients units
Unable to work 22% 9% 15%
Kept house 38% 18% 27%
Went to school 10% 40% 26%
Retiredlidle 15% 18% 17%
Other 15% 15% 15%
All head of f mlly units 100% 100% 100%
SOUIIO
60 Income Security Reform and the Concept of a Guaranteed Annual Income
• Reasons for Not Working or Lookingfor Work - Only a small
percentage of low-income individuals are prevented from
working or looking for work because of physical or health
reasons. In particular, among heads of families who did
not work or looked for work in 1990, only 22 percent of
social assistance recipients and 9 percent of non-recipients
did not work or look for work because they were unable to
do so (Table 5).
Table 6
Distribution of Working Heads of Low-Income, Non-Elderly Family Units,
by Full-Year Equivalent Level of Earnings, 1990
Social Non-social All
assistance assistance low-income
recipients recipients units
Full-time employees
Under $10,000 49% 38% 40%
$10,000-$19,999 42% 44% 44%
$20,000-$29,999 7% 13% 12%
$30,000 or more 2% 4% 4%
All full-time employees 100% 100% 100%
Part-time employees
Under $10,000 71% 51% 56%
$10,000-$19,999 21% 39% 35%
$20,000-$29,999 6% 6% 6%
$30,000 or more 2% 4% 3%
All part-time employees 100% 100% 100%
NOTE FUll-year equivalent earnings refers to potential earnings If a person worked 52 weeks a
year. at his/her usual weekly hours of work.
SOURCE Survey of Consumer Finances. 1990 incomes.
The major obstacle to employment of the low-tncome population is
not physical but economic. Most low-income individuals are
prevented from achieving financial self-sufficiency because of low
earnings potential, shortage of low-skill jobs, and financial
disincentives under existing social assistance programs. Th
E on mt ouncil of n d in 1 92 onclu k-d th t
Earnings Prospects
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Only a small proportion of the population is truly destitute and
has virtually no opportunity for achieving some level of
self-sufficiency. However, there are many Canadians whose
income-earnings prospects are precarious. (p. 18)
An indication of the precarious nature of the earnings of the poor is
that the majority of them would be below the poverty line even if
they worked all year round. For example, 84 percent of those who
worked full-time in 1990 [l.e., 36 or more hours per week) would
have earned less than $20,000 even if they worked 52 weeks (Table
6). This means that even if all heads of low-income family units
worked year round, most family units would still stay below the
poverty line.
Lack of marketable skills leads to inadequate earnings; it also
affects the employment prospects of individuals. According to the
LMAS data, most social assistance recipients feel that they are
prevented from finding employment not because of physical ltmrta-
tions or lack of jobs, but because of inadequate education, or lack
of job experience and skills. Social assistance recipients surveyed
for the LMASgave the following responses to questions about the
difficulty of looking for work:
• lacked education for available jobs - 52 percent;
• lacked the right skills for available jobs - 51 percent;
• lacked experience for available jobs - 49 percent;
• overall, 70 percent reported at least one of the difficulties
cited above;
• by contrast, only 20 percent reported having difficulty
finding employment because of a long-term physical con-
dition, mental condition, or health problems.
Poverty is a moving target. Family unit incomes change
significantly even over short periods. For low-income family units
on social assistance for a short period, the policy issue is' how to
influence the dynamics of labour market flows (e.g., introducing
work incentives through a GAl program, discouraging quits, and
encouraging job search). Low-income family units that stay longer
on social assistance may require both the work incentives of a GAl
and additional employment services to enhance employability.
Th hl~h vol 11111Iyof Ihe AO 1 1 popu lation implies that
over a t' I('lId(-cl IIIIW, 11\ lily low-w ~(' earn rs r Ilk ly t b m
r('('III('nl ,'1'111 1111 III I1I If 11 poll< to. uoccsafull con I In Ill('
11\11111)( I ClI III I il n I t IIIC', ,,'l'Ipl( III (' lIllIOI fO('IJ only Oil tilo I
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currently in the program. It has also to address the broader group
at risk of becoming recipients, namely low-wage earners.
Most social assistance recipients are potentially employable and
are currently employed or have had some attachment to the labour
force in the recent past. Most of them can be encouraged to seek
full-time employment with incentives created through a GAlprogram
and appropriate employment services, such as job information cen-
tres, referrals, placements, and counselling.
A GAl program would be most effective if it were complemented
by a wide range of employment services. Work incentives under a
GAl program are a necessary condition for encouraging
self-sufficiency. For many low-income individuals such work
incentives would be enough to minimize reliance on social assis-
tance. However, for others, especially those who have been trapped
in the welfare system for an extended period, additional help would
be required. This might include job referral services, work experience
projects, career training, day care for dependent children,
counselling, and life skill training.
The Current System
A full appreciation of the potential ofa GAlrequires an understanding
of the serious flaws of traditional approaches to income security.
This chapter provides a brief description of the main income security
programs for the working-age population, their main weaknesses,
and recent efforts to reform them.
At the heart of the interest in a GAl is the growing dissatisfaction
with the current income security system. It is becoming increasingly
difficult to sustain the status quo, especially in an environment of
fiscal crisis. In a nutshell, the three main concerns about the current
income security system are
• the existence of a "welfare trap" that discourages
self-sufficiency and contributes to the perpetuation of
poverty,
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• the presence of an unnecessarily complex system that is
costly to administer, often poorly targeted to the needy,
and inequitable to such groups as the working poor.
The idea of a GAl has reemerged precisely as a response to the
above concerns about the current income security system. The es-
sence of a GAl is to move away from universal income transfers
toward more targeted programs. The savings resulting from greater
selectivity can then be used to finance an income support system
that encourages self-sufficiency and shifts resources from passive
income support toward active programs to improve employability,
such as educational upgrading and training.
Following an overview of the main income transfer programs that
benefit the non-elderly, low-income population, the main limita-
tions of the current system, with a particular focus on the work
disincentives of social assistance programs, are discussed. As well,
a number of recent initiatives designed to address the issue of work
disincentives under social assistance are outlined.
Overview of the Current System
The main programs that benefit the non-elderly, low-income popu-
lation are family allowances and child tax credits, unemployment
insurance, and social assistance. Beginning in 1993, family
allowance and child tax credits were integrated into the Child Benefit
program, which is discussed in more detail later in this section. The
level of spending on these four major income transfer programs
between 1980-81 and 1992-93 is shown in Table 7.
Child Benefits (to the end of 1992)
• Family Allowance - about $35 per child was paid monthly
to all Canadian families with children under age 18. Family
Allowances were taxable and benefits were "clawed-back"
from higher income families.
• Child ,. di! - non-refundable annual tax credit of $71
p r hlld 11 re \ 1'3 r und r wa provid d a am t income
tmce OW( cl. '\'11(' t I (r('c\1t we, d uble aft r th ao 01 d htld,
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Table 7
Major Income Transfers, 1980-81 to 1992-93
($ million)
Federal/ Major
Federal Unemploy- Provincial Total Transfers/
Family Child ment Social Major Personal Personal
Allowances Tax Credit Insurance Assistance Transfers Income Income
1980-81 1,851 1,013 4,559 2,838 10,261 249,710 4.1%
1981-82 2,020 1,069 5,399 3,272 11,760 289,361 4.1%
1982-83 2,231 1,514 9,708 4,155 17,608 311,783 5.6%
1983-84 2,327 1,447 9,931 4,927 18,632 331,717 5.6%
1984-85 2,418 1,494 10,171 5,522 19,605 359,624 5.5%
1985-86 2,501 1,484 10,127 5,880 19,992 386,973 5.2%
1986-87 2,534 1,573 10,640 6,124 20,871 414,873 5.0%
1987-88 2,564 1,639 10,577 6,394 21,174 451,230 4.7%
1988-89 2,606 1,968 10,979 6,826 22,379 494,698 4.5%
1989-90 2,654 2,064 11,818 7,146 23,682 536,234 4.4%
1990-91 2,736 2,110 14,468 8,883 28,197 565,253 5.0%
1991-92 2,821 2,326 18,435 10,500 34,082 576,128 5.9%
1992-93 2,189 na 19,238 13,000 na na na
NOTES The Family Allowances and Child Tax Credit programs were replaced by the Child Benefit in
January 1993. For Personal Income, calendar-year data have been converted to fiscal-year
data.
SOURCES Major Income Transfers: Health and Welfare Canada, Social Security Statistics: Canada
and Provinces, 1993. Provincial payments to individuals under social assistance for 1991-
92 and 1992-93 are not readily available. Estimates provided here are based on rough
calculations.
Personal Income: Department of Finance, Reference Tables, August 1993.
• Refundable Chi1.dTax Credit - a refundable tax credit of
up to $601 a year was provided for each child age 18 or
under.
In addition, the GST refundable credits, while relatively small,
have components for children and adults.
Unemployment Insurance (as of 1993)
Unemployment Insurance, the main program protecting individual
from the financial h rd hip of un mploym nt whil lookln for
n w j b, i nada' larg t In ID urtty pro r m. A ordtn t
111<'f( lcral budgct. I, In. lnllton of ben flt. were paid tn flscal y r
I ()D 0:\,
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UI was radically changed in 1971 and it now covers about 95
percent of all paid workers in Canada. Since 1971, the program has
repeatedly been amended to tighten its eligibility criteria and to
lower the rate of benefits. The most recent thrust is toward shifting
from "passive" income support to "active" training and reemployment
initiatives.
To qualify for benefits, a person must be actively searching for
employment and in the previous two weeks must have had a mini-
mum of 10 to 20 weeks of insurable earnings, depending on the
regional unemployment rate. Claimants may receive benefits for 17
to 50 weeks, depending on their weeks of insurable earnings and
the regional unemployment rate. The weekly benefit payments are
57 percent of insurable earnings, up to a maximum of $426 per
week in 1992.
In addition, UI pays special benefits, which include maternity
and parental leave and sickness. Under section 26 of the
Unemployment Insurance Act, claimants may receive benefits while
attending training courses or participating in job creation projects.
Social Assistance
Social Assistance is Canada's social security system's program of
"last resort." According to the constitution, each province is
responsible for the design, administration, and delivery of its own
social assistance program. Consequently, there is considerable va-
riation in the design and level ofbenefits from province to province.
The federal government contributes to the financing of social as-
sistance through the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP),which covers
50 percent of approved costs of social assistance programs. The
federal contribution to social assistance under CAP in fiscal year
1992-93 was $6.3 billion.
Since 1990, the federal contribution to provinces that do not
receive Equalization Payments (Ontario, Alberta, and British Co-
lumbi ) ha b n pp d at 5 percent annual growth. This has
ub tantlnll red 1 id lh hare of octal assistance spending
fu ode' I h 11uo li (krlll tovcrnrn nt. F' r x mpl . "F d ral tran C rs
to 1111110 ••. III u ik h orn /)0 I er cnt of OCI~ll n 1 tan ,0, t. I
IOHO 10 III ' H JlIII'( III III I l)2 la:' ( nt 1'10. MIIII II or
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Generally speaking, social assistance may be granted to any person
in need. The needs test takes into account the budgetary
requirements and the income and assets available to the applicant
and other members of the applicant's household to meet such
requirements. The majority of social assistance recipients tend to
be either disabled, unemployed employable persons, or single pa-
rents.
Benefits include income payments for shelter costs, food, clothing
and other necessities. Awide range of other benefits or services are
also provided to meet specific needs, such as dental care or pres-
cription drugs, or to improve employability, such as training or
daycare (Table 8).
Table 8
Maximum Social Assistance Benefits, by Type of Household, 1992
In most cases, income other than earnings leads to a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in social assistance benefits. The
treatment of earnings under the various provincial systems is
summarized in Table 9. The table is a simplification of a rather
complex system and provides only a broad impression of how the
system op rates. As a g n ral rul ,provinces tax back most of the
rntngs Cl'r llowan .e ts m d for work r 1 t d exp n and a
I-I nn allow hl( (' ('1111I Ion.
Single Single Couple &
Province Employable parent & two
one child children
Newfoundland 4,301 11,198 12,119
Prince Edward Island 7,872 10,920 16,303
Nova Scotia 5,904 10,368 12,432
New Brunswick 3,048 8,304 9,318
Quebec 5,994 10,623 13,050
Ontario 8,186 14,817 19,396
Manitoba 6,906 10,618 17,741
Saskatchewan 5,375 10,311 14,683
Alberta 5,640 10,104 15,696
British Columbia 6,308 11,373 14,389
Average 5,953 10,864 14,513
NOTE Benefits Include the basic living allowance and the maximum shelter allowance. Benefits do
not Include any special needs allowances or other government transfers, e.g., family
allowances, the child tax credit, child related benefits, sales taxJGST credits, and provincial
tax credits.
SOURCE National Council of Welfare, Welfare Incomes 1992, Spring 1993.
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Table 9
Treatment of Earnings
Under Provincial Social Assistance Programs, 1992
Newfoundland
50% of net earnings up to $80 per month for single and $200 per month for families is
exempt. Net earnings above the exemption level are taxed back at 100%. Net earnings
exclude work-related costs (such as UI, CPP and union premiums, income taxes,
transportation costs, required special equipment or clothing, babysitting).
Prince Edward Island
The first $50 of net earnings per month for single and $100 for families is exempt. Above
the exemption level, net earnings are taxed back at 90%. Net earnings exclude UI, CPP,
income taxes, pension contributions, and other deductions that are a condition of receiving
wages.
Nova Scotia
The first $100 of gross earnings per month for single and $200 for families is exempt.
Above the exemption level, gross earnings are taxed back at 75%.
New Brunswick
The first $150 of gross earnings per month for single and $200 for families is exempt.
Above the exemption level, gross earnings are taxed back at 100%. Net earnings excludes
non-voluntary deductions (income taxes, UI, CPP, etc.).
Quebec
Under the Financial Support Program, $100 of net earnings per month is exempt. Net
earnings exclude non-voluntary contributions. For clients of the Work and Employment
Incentives Program, the exemption level varies according to the client's participation in
training and related programs ..Above the exemption level, net earnings are taxed back at
100%. Families with children can receive earnings supplementation under the APPORT
program, which reduces the effective tax-back rate below 100%. (APPORT is discussed
below in the section on recent policy initiatives.)
Ontario
Under the provincial STEP program, $160 of net earnings per month for single and $175
for families is exempt. Net earnings exclude work-related costs. Above the exemption level,
net earnings are taxed back at 75%. The taxed back amount, however, is reduced by the
amount of eligible child care costs.
Manitoba
Under the provincial Work Incentives provision, the earnings exemption is the greatest of
(i) $50 per month; (ii) 70 cents per hour worked; or (iii) 30% of gross earnings. An amount
equal to work-related expenses is also exempt. Effectively, the incremental tax-back rate
on earnings is 70%.
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Alberta
Monthly net earnings are taxed back as follows:
a) earnings up to $115 0%
b) $116to$200 50%
c) $201 to $300 75%
d) over$300 900/0
Table 9 - Treatment of Earnings
Under Provincial Social Assistance Programs, 1992 continued
Saskatchewan
Net earnings exclude involuntary deductions and actual work-related costs may be included
in the budgetary requirements. The monthly exemption ranges from $25 plus 20% of net
earnings (up to a maximum $75) for single, to $125 plus 20% of net earnings (up to a
maximum of $250) for families with five or more members. Effectively, the incremental
tax-back rate is 80% up to a certain level, and then 100%.
British Columbia
The monthly exemption level is $100 for single and $200 for families. Earnings above the
exemption level are taxed back at 75%.
Weaknesses of the Current System
There is a growing consensus that the income security system is
ineffective and too costly. The main criticisms of each of the above
programs are described in turn. '
Child Benefits
The main concern about child benefits prior to 1993, particularly
Family Allowances, was that benefits were not sufficiently targeted
to low-income families. At the centre of the debate was the issue of
universality versus selectivity. The proponents of universality argued
that Family Allowances were a matter of "horizontal" equity - within
the same income bracket there is a need for income redistribution
from families without children to families with children because of
the difference in financial needs due to the presence of children.
Family Allowances were also viewed as a means of life-cycle redis-
tribution, the mirror program to public pensions, part of the broad
"social contract."
The proponents of selectivity argued that the most critical social
issue is pov rty and, tv n th urr nt fi al ri 1 ,th only pr ti 1
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way to address the problem of poverty is to re-target existing funds.
The selectivity view has won some support: changes under the for-
mer federal government, primarily with respect to child benefits.
were in the direction of a better targeting ofbenefits to the low-income
population.
Unemployment Insurance (as of 1993)
Unemployment Insurance has received by far the largest share of
criticism. At the heart of the debate is whether UI is an insurance
program or simply an arbitrary income redistribution program.
The critics complain that it is possible to qualify for as many as
39 weeks of benefits by working as few as ten weeks in a year. In
many cases. there is no risk of unemployment but instead a virtual
certainty. as is the case for seasonal workers who return to UI for
income support on a regular basis. The main criticisms that have
been raised against the current UI program are
• Most of the money is spent on passive income support.
rather than on improving the employability of the
unemployed. There is growing evidence that a significant
part of unemployment is structural. For example. the job
vacancy rate corresponding to different levels of
unemployment has been growing. Also. according to the
Labour Market Activity Survey. well over half of all
unemployed feel that they have difficulty finding work
because they lack the education. skills. or experience
required for available jobs.
• UI contributes to higher unemployment by prolonging
unproductive job search; by making seasonal jobs more
attractive; and by encouraging the participation in the la-:
bour force of marginal workers who may not be interested
in full-time. year-round work.
• The overwhelming share of benefits (about 90 percent
according to the Survey of Consumer Finances) does not
o to low-in om f mill (Table 10). It is also difficult to
rt ttonnltzc l>elldll:-; on the b 1 of in uran b ause the
In. llr('d I VI IIItI ilu y often C u ra wtlh pr dt t bl
1'C'f t 11 11 It y.
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Table 10
Incidence of UI Benefits, 1990
Low-income
family
units
Total number
Number of recipients
Percent of all recipients
Percentage incidence
Average amount
Total amount ($million)
Percent of total amount
1,776,246
321,483
14.4%
18.1%
$3,760
$1,209
11.4%
High-income
family
units
All
family
units
7,192,813
1,903,765
85.6%
26.5%
$4,924
$9,373
88.6%
8,969,059
2,225,248
100.0%
24.8%
$4,755
$10,582
100.0%
SOURCE Survey of Consumer Finances, 1991 (1990 income, census households).
Social Assistance
Social assistance recipients are often economically inactive not
because of absolute physicallirnitations, but because of inadequacies
in the social assistance system. Many recipients lack adequate
technical and life skills and require training to qualify even for
entry-level jobs. However, most resources are devoted to passive
income support and little is done to build marketable skills. As a
major recent consultation report concluded
... most barriers to training for Social Assistance Recipients arise
from poor program design, rather than from any inherent
difficulties of social assistance recipients. (Canadian Labour Mar-
ket and Productivity Centre 1990, p. 110)
The problem of the lack of emphasis on training is compounded by
a structure of social assistance benefits that creates a poverty trap
and fosters dependency. Once on social assistance, the high rate of
tax-back of earned income and the loss of social benefits can make
it unattractive for recipients to take low-wage, entry-level jobs.
Social assistance programs have been criticized for their almost
exclusive focus on providing financial assistance and their limited
involvement in assessing the future prospects of clients and assisting
them to regain self-sufficiency. The system does little to help people
exit the longer term benefits stream and, often, it unwittingly sets
up obstacles to individual initiativ . The following charact ri ti
P ift lly ltrntt so I 1as i t n pr r ms:
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• A Narrow Definition of Employability - The current
employable/unemployable distinction prevents a significant
number of social assistance recipients from participating
in training programs. For example, people with disabilities
are generally labelled as unemployable even though many
of them want to work and are capable of working. As a
result, a significant portion of social assistance rectptents
are unable to access training opportunities.
• An Inadequate Focus on Training - The narrow definition
problem is compounded by the fact that a disproportionately
small amount of resources are devoted to long-term training
and complementary employment services to improve the
marketability of recipients. Often, training programs for
social assistance recipients
- are not widely available;
- are short term;
- are not closely linked to shortages and potential
employment opportunities in the local labour market;
- focus on the requirements of a specific job and place
limited emphasis on skills that can be transferred from
job to job;
- do not address basic weaknesses, such as inadequate
literacy, numeracy, life skills, communication skills,
and transferable technical skills.
• Disincentives to Employment - Under existing social as-
sistance programs, there is often little or no incentive to
participate in the labour force because employment at low
wages results in small or no benefits to the recipient. Income .
testing of supplementation, rent, and other subsidies means
that each dollar of earnings may result in an almost
equivalent, and some times greater, reduction in the
disposable income of the recipient, creating a "welfare trap."
Work disincentives can be compounded by the "stacking"
of tax-back rates from different programs. Unless different
pro ram (su h in om upport. subsidized daycare, or
, ub: tdtz d hOIIHln~) fir pr p rly h rrn ntz d. it i po t-
ble f r H ('1'1 1111r III rC'of ,"'lIlnl4, to hr ve An ov r 11t -b k
r Ile- ,bov!' I ()() I (','(I'll t.
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Recent Policy Initiatives (as of 1992)
Recent changes in the major income transfer programs include the
replacement of Family Allowance and child tax credits by the Child
Benefit program; the shift of UI funds toward training under the
Labour Force Development Strategy (LFDS); and provincial initiati-
ves to strengthen work incentives, such as APPORT, Quebec's Pa-
rental Wage Assistance Program.
• increase and target benefits - total federal child assistance
is greater and increased benefits are directed to low- and
modest-income families,
The Child Benefit Program
The most important recent development in income transfer programs
has been the introduction of the Child Benefit program, an example
of the integration of social program payments into the income tax
system. The new program, which integrated Family Allowances and
child tax credits into a single refundable tax credit, is intended to
• supplement earnings - the child tax benefit includes an
earned income supplement that provides additional sup-
port for low-income parents in the workforce, and
• consolidate benefits - the program replaced Family
allowances, the non-refundable child tax credit, and the
refundable child tax credit with a uniform refundable tax
credit.
The Child Benefit consists of a Basic Benefit and an Earned Income
Supplement. For example, a family with two children receives a
Basic Benefit of $2,040 annually. Above $25,921 of net family
income, the Basic Benefit is taxed back at 5 percent. The amount of
the Earned Income Supplement is calculated to be 8 percent of the
annual earnings above the first $3,750, to a maximum supplement
of $500. Above $20,921 of net family income, the supplement is
taxed back at lO percent.
The earnings supplement component is modelled after the AP-
PORT program, although the level of upplementation is stgruftcantly
lower. Th main attr tion f th Chtld B nefit i th ration ltz tion
nd b tt .r t r~ tln~ of. ('V ,r,1 progrnnu .
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Unemployment Insurance (as of 1992)
The most important recent development with respect to the UI
program has been the introduction of the Labour Force Development
Strategy. The impetus for the LFDS came from the realization that
while training and education are increasingly more critical to la-
bour market adjustment and competitiveness, public resources are
largely devoted to passive income maintenance.
The LFDS, an important initiative in the evolution of the UI
program, shifted resources from passive income maintenance into
active training and other employability enhancement programs. In
addition to placing more emphasis on training and reemployment,
the LFDS also launched a more inclusive process involving busi-
ness, labour, the educational community, and equity groups with
the goal of improving training effort throughout the private sector.
Part of the increased UI funding for training was directed to social
assistance recipients, while additional funding was directed to
individuals at risk of relying on social assistance.
The focus on training is a crucial complement to the increase of
work incentives. To be effective in integrating individuals into the
labour market, public programs must combine both training and
work incentives. In that sense, one could make the argument that a
logical extension of the LFDSwould be to shift more UI funding into
work incentives, in the form of an earnings supplement or a GAl
program.
Social Assistance
An important prerequisite to the success of any employability ini-
tiative is to ensure that work effort receives adequate financial
reward. Unless wages are adequate and net earnings signiflcant,
most attempts to train or facilitate integration into the labour mar-
ket are likely to fail.
There are two broad approaches to address the issue of financial
incentives. Several previous studies (including the Macdonald Com-
mission) have tak n the approach that the entire system of income
tr n f r nd t .13 n cd to b r vamp d. How ver, b caus of the
m p;nlt udc of t 11(: eh mg<, rcqutr l, su h p roach , h v n v r n
lrnplcnu ntrx].
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The alternative approach is to introduce small practical
incremental changes to redress some of the existing imbalances in
the complex system of federal-provincial-municipal income security
programs.
• to keep low-wage earners with dependent children in the
labour market, and
An interesting initiative that falls under the latter approach is
Quebec's APPORTprogram. It offers incentives for the working poor
to stay in the labour market while at the same time, by offsetting
part of the high tax-back rates of social assistance, encouraging
social assistance recipients to seek employment. More specifically,
the program is targeted to both social assistance recipients and the
working poor and its stated objectives are
• to encourage social assistance recipients with dependent
children to enter the labour force.
A simplified overviewof the APPORTprogram is presented in order
to describe the main character of the program, rather than to provide
a precise description of its features.
The APPORT program is designed to supplement the earnings of
single parents or couples with children. To qualify for benefits in
any given month, an individual must have at least $150 of earnings.
Benefits start when annualized earnings exceed $3,445.
As long as the annualized earnings (i.e., average monthly earnings
times 12) are less than the level of income needs ($11,730 in our
example), the parent receives 45 cents for each additional dollar of
earnings over the initial annual figure $3,445. Once the annualized
earnings exceed the level of needs, for each additional dollar earnings
APPORT benefits are reduced by 42 cents. One can distinguish two
cases:
• Individuals Without Social Assistance - In this case,
individuals have a strong incentive to bring their earnings
up to the level of needs; beyond that point they face a 42
percent tax-back rate; however, this rate is lower than the
50 percent tax-back rate often advocated in the literature
as a reasonable limit and it is considerably lower than the
traditional 100 p rent rate under social assistance.
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• Individuals With Social Assistance - In this case, the 45
percent subsidy effectivelyreduces the 100 percent tax-back
rate of social assistance to 55 percent. The work incentive
is not as strong as for those not receiving social assistance;
however, it is a more reasonable rate than the 100 percent
rate under social assistance: when earnings exceed the level
of needs, both groups of individuals are treated the same.
APPORT offers an interesting way of addressing some of the ma-
jor weaknesses of the current income security system. It does this
in an incremental fashion, rather than by the more drastic approach
of revamping the whole gamut of subsidies, tax credits, and taxes.
However, there are a number of issues. The most important is
the low take-up of the program. There are only about 17,000 recipient
families, 40 percent ofwhich also receive social assistance. This is
far below the number of eligible working poor in Quebec. Therefore,
although the design of the program is quite attractive, its
effectiveness is seriously limited by the fact that it reaches only a
small percentage of its intended target population. This may be
attributed to the fact that it is a new program and it has not been
adequately publicized.
Another issue concerns adjustment payments at the end of the
year. Because the earnings of the working poor are quite volatile, it
is difficult to avoid making under- or overpayments. To avoid the
difficulty of collecting overpayments, monthly payments are set equal
to 75 percent of entitlements, with balances paid at the end of the
year. However, even with a 25 percent hold-back, it is not uncommon
to have to request recipients to refund part of the benefits.
Several summary points of this overview of the current income
security system are particularly relevant to this discussion of a GAl
plan. The system in place is characterized by an excessive focus on
passive income support, a weak link between entitlements and so-
cial insurance or income redistribution principles, and serious work
disincentives as a result of prohibitive tax-back rates.
Recent changes, both at the federal and provincial level, indicate
gr wing awar nes nd willin n ss to respond to the need to break
th w lfar trap. 'or ( mplc, th hild n fit program improved
th t I' rcttn , of III Iwflt. uno tntrodu .d mod t rrnng
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the allocation of public funds between passive income maintenance
and active employability initiatives. Following up on the
recommendations of the Macdonald Commission, it proposed a
broader definition of active policies, which would include work
incentives. The Quebec experiment, although modest, provides an
example of the kind of programs that can be employed to break the
welfare trap. These three reforms show the direction that the income
security system needs to take to achieve a better coherence between
income maintenance policies and labour market policies.
Despite recent reforms in income security programs, many
fundamental problems remain. The current social assistance system
is still too complex, involving a maze of ill-understood programs.
Rectpients are penalized forworking through substantial reductions
in benefits, while the working poor receive little or no assistance.
The Child Benefit program has rationalized the child benefit part
of income security. However, the program only begins the reforms
necessary to the income security system. UI is still a costly program,
with benefits poorly targeted to those with a major attachment to
the labour force or in financial need, and an insufficient focus on
improving the employability prospects of the unemployed.
The idea of a Guaranteed Annual Income (GAl)is increasingly
being seen as a way to rationalize the existing income security
system. Some of the recent policy initiatives have moved income
security in this direction; however, a strong case can be made for
replacing many of the current income transfers with a comprehensive
GAl program.
The Guaranteed Annual Income Concept
During the past two decades, a large number of GAl schemes have
been proposed by governments, policy institutions, academics, and
social advocates. The main objective of the following very selective
review of some of these proposals is to describe the essential elements
of a GAl concept and to provide an appreciation of its strengths and
the challenges that must be overcome to implement it. This section
also includes a non-t chnical dl u ion of th potential impact of
GAl pr r m on work In nUv
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Basic Aspects
The following description, in simple terms, of the concept of a GAl,
and the discussion of some basic issues and alternative methods of
implementation is not intended to cover the full range of issues, but
rather to provide an appreciation of the fundamental aspects of a
GAl program.
In the Simplified example of a GAlprogram presented graphically
in Chart 1, the maximum benefit per household is $5,000, and is
referred to as the minimum guaranteed income level (G). In practice,
G relates to the size of the household. Also, coverage can be universal
or it can be limited to certain types of households, such as
households with dependent children.
Chart 1
A Simplified GAl Program
GAl, Total Income ($000)
15,-----------------------------------------~
5
10
p
O~------------L-----------~------------~
5 10 15
Earnings ($000)
The level of benefits (B) is reduced only partially in the presence
of earnings so that there is an incentive for the recipient to work. In
the case of two-adult hous holds, earnings typically refer to the
ombtn darning of th two p u In th xampl h re, th
b n /)1 r .du tton rnte, r I' rr et 10 a Ih / -ba kra/ (r),ts asum d
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to be 50 percent. At any given level of earnings, therefore, the level
of benefits is given by the following formula:
B = G - r*E
In the above example, at $10,000 of earnings, the level ofbenefits
becomes zero. This level of earnings is referred to as the break-even
point (P).It relates to the minimum guaranteed level and the tax-back
rate through the following formula:
P = G/r
This equation indicates the fundamental trade-off among the three
basic parameters of a GAlprogram: in order to keep the break-even
point (and therefore the size of the eligible population) constant, a
decrease in the tax-back rate to improve work incentives requires a
reduction in the minimum guaranteed income level as well.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between adequacy and work incentives.
If part of the earnings of the family unit are subject to income
taxes, or the family unit is eligible for income pro-rated benefits
(such as subsidized daycare) then the effective tax-back rate can be
considerably higher. This issue is referred to as stacking of tax-back:
rates. To avoid this problem, taxes should not start below the
break-even point. Even more complicated, however, is the
harmonization of a GAl program with independently administered
income-tested social services.
Mechanisms to Implement a GAl Plan
As it was described in the introduction, Friedman's original idea of
a GAl was a negative income tax. One of the advantages of the
negative income tax approach is that it precludes the possibility of
an overlap of tax-back rates and positive income tax rates. One
particular form of a negative income tax, which is increasingly being
utilized in Canada, is a refundable tax credit. Under this option,
family units receive a credit against taxes owed, or if no taxes are
owed. a cash payment. The value of the tax credit depends on the
level of income. Payments can be made when an income tax return
is submitted, or periodi ally throu hout th y r b d on th 1v 1
f in m in th pr ViOIl, y r.
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Administratively and constitutionally. refundable tax credits are
the simplest mechanism to improve the income security system.
which explains their growing popularity in Canada. At the same
time. a major limitation of tax credits is their lack of responsiveness
to changes in current income. So far this has not been a major
issue because of the small level of benefits paid through refundable
tax credits and the low tax-back rate." However. this will become a
more serious concern if tax credits become a major component of
the income support system.
There is a wide range of alternative options. For example. one
option is to replace the entire income support system under social
assistance with a single GAl program. Another is to leave basic
income support to the provinces and introduce a federal second-tier
program of earnings supplementation. either through tax credits or
through the VI system. Anumber of specific proposals are considered
in the next section.
Past Proposals for GAl Programs
In the past two decades. several proposals were put forward for a
GAl program to make the income security system more effective in
alleviating poverty. Four key proposals are briefly reviewed here:
• the 1971 Senate Report on Poverty in Canada. one of the
first proposals for utilizing a GAl program to eradicate
poverty;
• the 1973 report of the Federal-Provincial Social Security
Review (the Orange Paper), which proposed the concept of
a two-tier system, of income support and income
supplementation;
• the 1978 Department ofFinance White Paper on Integration
of Social Program Payments into the Income Tax System.
which was the precursor to the use ofrefundable tax credits
as a part of the income security system; and
• th 1985 r rt of th Royal Commission on the Economic
Unt I nd v lopi nt: Pro p ts for Canada (the Macdo-
nald Oll1l11\ ion). which vo.t d much more
f'nr-I'('IWhlll I IIve'l'lInttl 01 Ih(' IIIr.oITl< sccurn y t m.Tt r -
('()II1JIII'1l !c'd ,'11111111dill (tlJllve'I' tI PI'O ,l'lIn ,1t~hl('111t1 UI.
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and shifting the resulting savings into the funding of a
Universal Income Security Program and active reemploy-
ment policies.
The Senate Report
The key elements of the Senate Report on Poverty proposal were the
following:
• the GAlwill be a federal program, covering all Canadians;
• the Basic Allowance Rates will be set initially at 70 percent
of the poverty lines, defined in relation to the average stan-
dard of living and estimated using a method similar to the
one Statistics Canada employs to determine the low-income
cut-off lines;
• the tax-back rate will be set at 70 percent;
• the GAlwill be divorced from the provision of social servi-
ces' which will remain a provincial responsibility and
cost-shared with the federal government under CAP;
• universal programs, such as Old Age Security and Family
Allowance will be repealed;
• no one will receive less money under the GAl than is
currently the case under other federal programs; and
• the income tax exemptions levels will be raised so that no
Canadian whose income is below the poverty line will pay
any taxes.
The Senate proposal focused on adequacy, rather than on work
incentives. The 70 percent tax-back rate is fairly high, not much
better than what is already in place in many provinces. Also, under
the plan, social services would be operated by a different jurisdiction,
presumably employing separate income-tested fees, thus raising
the prospect of stacking tax-back rates. Finally, it is not realistic to
propose that no one receive less money in federal transfers under a
GAl than they are currently receiving. The current fiscal reality calls
for more selectivity and a shift of resources from those with higher
incomes to those with lower incomes.
The Orange Paper
Th f d rs 1~ovrrnmcnt outline the si 1 m nu of AIprogr m
111 It. \ !)7:1Wnrk ln P '\)/'I 011 • od d • '('('unt In ;nn. I . Like the
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Senate report, the Orange Paper focused on adequacy; its opening
paragraph states
The central, though by no means the sole, objective of social
security in Canada is an acceptable basic income for all Canadians
- whether that income comes through employment, if a person
is able to work, or through pensions or allowances if a person is
unable or not expected to work. For a basic income is essential if
a person is to live in decency and in dignity. (Government of
Canada 1973, p. 4)
The Orange Paper proposed a two-tier GAl program, consisting of
an income supplementation tier and an income support tier.
Income Supplementation Recommendation: That the income of
those who are working but whose incomes are inadequate by
reason of family size ... or by reason of the nature of their
employment (low-paying self-employment or intermittent or par-
tial employment) should be supplemented under a single, general
income supplementation plan, with built-in work incentives. (p. 30)
Income Support Recommendation: That a guaranteed income
should be available to people whose incomes are insufficient
because they are unable or are not expected to work, namely the
retired or disabled, single parent families, and people who are not
presently employable by reason of a combination of factors such
as age, lack of skills, or length of time out of the labour market.
The guaranteed income will be paid in the form of an additional
income supplement over and above the general income
supplementation available ... (p. 32)
The White Paper
The Department of Finance discussion paper entitled "Integration
of Social Payments into the Income Tax System" made a case for
using the income tax system to implement social programs, including
income supplementation.
The main instrument proposed, the refundable tax credit. has
several advantages:
• trnplt lty
• low fldmlntHt ra lion ost
• tnf(~ rntlou wtlh 1r\('OIlH: tnxo (It vot 1. AI~ king in omc
t n , Jl cl I, h le' I~ I' It (. )
~---------------------------------------------------------------
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• a high take-up rate among the targeted population
• it avoids the thorny constitutional issue of who has
jurisdiction over GAl
... at present there does not exist a neat system whereby each
Canadian individual or family receives a number of regular
monthly transfer payments and makes a regular monthly tax
payment. Thus it is not possible to offsetthe twoflows.Themove
towards a tax/transfer system may therefore have some costs in
terms of the ability to aim programs at intended beneftctartes.
(Canada. Department ofFinance 1978,p. 33)
The mechanism of the refundable tax credit is increasingly being
used in Canada to rationalize the income security system. The most
recent example is the integration of several types of benefits into
the refundable Child Benefit tax credit.
As the White Paper acknowledged, however, the main weakness
of refundable tax credits is the lagged response ofbenefits to changes
in the income situation of the recipient.
The Macdonald Report
One of the main recommendations of the Macdonald Commission
was
...an option which delivers a relatively low guarantee level, but
which also has a lower reduction rate combined with a special
'top-up' for those who cannot be expectedto work,willproduce a
moredesirablecombinationofincomesupport andworkincentives
[relative to a uniform GAlprograml. Such an option would not
providea payment high enough to encourage employablepeople
to relywhollyon it, and it wouldnot tax back benefitson earnings
at a rate high enough to discourage the earning of income. We
prefer to describe such a package as a 'UniversalIncomeSecurity
Program' (UISP).(RoyalCommissionon the EconomicUnion and
DevelopmentProspects forCanada 1985, p. 795)
• GIS (but not OAS)
• Family Allowances
• Child T x r t s
• mu rrl( rl (' (ompt Ion.
The Commission recommended (pp, 824-25) that the UISP replace
existing federal tax and transfer programs including
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• child exemptions
• federal contributions to social assistance programs
• federal social housing programs
The Macdonald Commission's proposal is similar in some res-
pects to that proposed in the Orange Paper. However, the Macdo-
nald Commission is more comprehensive because it also called for
a tightening of the UI program. In particular, it recommended that
"the UISP should be put in place at the same time as the broad UI
reforms described above" (p. 825).
The Issue of Work Incentives
One of the stumbling blocks to the implementation of a GAl program
is the potential work disincentive effects on those currently not on
social assistance. A GAl program is expected to improve work
incentives among social assistance rectpients by effectively lowering
the tax-back rate on their earnings. However, it is also expected to
have some potential work disincentive effects among the working
poor not on social assistance.
According to standard labour supply theory, a GAl program is
expected to reduce the work effort of the working poor not currently
on social assistance because of the presence of two effects: an
"income" and a "substitution" effect. Although the two effects act
simultaneously, for the sake of simplicity of presentation, let us
assume that they act in sequence.
• The Income Effect - Suppose that, based on its current
income, the household qualifies for $4,000 ofGAlpayments
annually. Let us assume that initially there is no reaction
to the introduction of the GAl and that the members of the
household continue working the same hours and receive
the same amount of earnings. The added $4,000 of income
is allocated between consumer goods, paying off debts, and
savings.
However, one type of consumer good, in a broad sense, is
"1 i ure." Lei ur is an economic jargon for time spent on
u h thing hou k ping, looking after one's own
.htldrcn, lr. 1I1I)ly r HUn~ And) v1n g od ttm . Th
• tnud \1'(1 t lu-r» PI"( 11<'1. th'lt the typical hou: chold Will
" pe lid" JIlt t lit tlu I Ide d tllC'01l1t (1I1 )(11 Ill'(,
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Let us assume that some members of the household decide
to work less and that, as a result, the household earnings
are reduced by $1,000. This reduction in work effort and
earnings is referred to as the "income effect."
• The Substitution Effect - Let us assume the tax-back rate
of the GAlprogram is 50 percent. The $1,000 reduction in
earnings will result in a $500 increase in GAl which will
offset half of the loss in earnings. In fact, each additional
one dollar decrease in earnings results in only a 50 cent
decrease in household income.
If the household was not paying any income taxes prior to
the introduction of the GAl, the 50 percent tax-back rate
means that the benefit of added work is much lower with
the GAl.To put it differently, the cost ofleisure in terms of
lost income is much lower.
Suppose that, faced with the 50 percent "penalty," the
members of the household decide to reduce their work
further and, as a result, household earnings are reduced
by an additional $2,000. This further decrease in work ef-
fort and earnings is referred to as the "substitution effect. "3
In the above example, the income and the substitution effects of
th GAl lead to a $3,000 reduction in household earnings. As a
r ult, the household has $1,500 less in total income and the cost
of the GAl program is $1,500 higher, compared to the situation if
th re had been no change in work effort.
The impact of a GAl on the working poor has been extensively
tnv tigated, primarily in the U.S. It has been studied by using both
ro -sectional data as well as experimental data from pilot studies
In 1 cted communities. Although there is significant variation in
lh findings of the various studies, there appears to be some con-
I cnsu . In particular, it would appear that in most cases, a GAl
pro~r m has a very limited negative effect on the work behaviour of
I lult m 1 s, but a more noticeable negative effect on the work
lx-liavt ur of f mal spouses.
HI'.ults from th M ntlob 1 om xp rim nt (Mm ome), which
I tll(' onl CIIIlH llnn ( I (I"hl\( nt, SI cm I lndt t r 1 ttv ly low r
III utvr- 1'(' pou (', III pll ttculur,
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The results from Mincome may be compared to those from four
U.S. experiments. The labour supply response from Mincome is
lower than any of the U.S. results for men and married women,
although similar results obtained from the Gary (Indiana)
experiment for single female heads. The Mincome results imply a
labour supply response of 0.8 to 1.6 percent for men compared to
a combined response of 5 percent from the U.S. experiments; a
response of 2.4 to 3 percent for married women compared to 21
percent in the United States; and a response of 3.8 to 5.3 percent
for single female heads compared to 13.2 percent in the United
States. In short much smaller responses. (Hum and Simpson 1991,
pp. xiv-xv)
The traditional view, based primarily on U.S. experimental and
non-experimental studies, is that the negative effect of a GAlon the
working poor is more significant than its positive effect on social
assistance recipients. However, this is less likely to be the case in
Canada for two reasons. First, work disincentives tend to be relatively
more serious in the Canadian income security system than in the
U.S. system and, therefore, the scope for work incentives among
social assistance recipients is relatively greater. For example, the
generosity ofunemployment insurance and social assistance benefits
to unemployed individuals is three times higher in Canada than in
the U.S. (Elmeskov 1993, p. 88). Second, the working poor (not on
social assistance) face higher income tax rates in Canada.
Consequently, the introduction of the same GAl scheme in the two
countries would cause a relatively smaller increase in the combined
tax-back and income tax rates in Canada than it would in the U.S.
Given that the negative impact of a GAlprogram on the working
poor is likely to be very small and that there is extensive scope for a
positive impact among social assistance rectptents, it is probably
fair to conclude that the introduction of a GAl is not likely to have
an overall negative effect on the Canadian labour force. Indeed, there
are reasons to be optimistic about the impact of a GAlprogram on
work incentives. Much of the theory and empirical evidence is based
on static analysis. However, the volatility of the social assistance
population provides some reason to believe that a GAlmay have the
beneficial effect of reducing the tendency of the working poor to
resort to so tal assistance. In other words, although the static la-
bour supply th ory m y b right in pr dieting a reduction (albeit
. m 11) in the' houra of work m ng th working p or not urr ntly
on AOCiHla.. I I mr C', (lVC r 11 10 tcr p<rlocl th trn] ( t n the l' bour
upp] ('mlld ('VI'1l 11( po Hlvr: IIlIOIl 1111'worl{lllg poor. Till would
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result from raising the incomes of the working poor significantly
above those on social assistance and making it relatively less at-
tractive for them to fall back on social assistance. In the longer run,
the decreased reliance on social assistance would result in a greater
attachment to the labour force and enhanced employability. Also,
to the extent that a GAl is funded through UI cuts, it may have
further positive work incentives.
As this discussion indicates, there has certainly been no shortage
of GAl proposals in Canada over the last 20 years. Frequently, they
have been motivated by the desire to improve the income support to
the poor. However, other important considerations, which are
becoming increasingly more important, include the desire to
• extend benefits to the relatively neglected working poor,
• improve work incentives and increase self-sufficiency among
the low-income population, and
• reduce the overall cost of the income-support system by
better targeting of income transfers to the low-income popu-
lation.
The most difficult challenge facing governments is to overcome
public resistance to changing existing programs, primarily the UI
program. Without a major reform of existing programs, it is unlikely,
in the current fiscal environment, that even a modest GAl program
could be implemented. There are several other issues to be
considered, ranging from federal-provincial jurisdictional issues to
the necessary complementary reform of the income tax system to
facilitate harmonization between a GAlprogram and income taxes.
However, by far the most serious stumbling block to a GAl program
is public resistance to changes in existing programs.
Guaranteed Annual Income Options
A simple GAlprogram is described here to illustrate several aspects
of the GAl concept. The treatment is selective and does not deal
with all the potential implications of a GAl program. Nevertheless,
estimates of the number ofbeneficiaries and the cost ofthe program
if it had been implemented in 1993 are provided and UI changes to
implement a GAlprogram in a deficit-neutral way discussed. Alter-
native implementation m chantsm ar con id r d a i th i u
of f d r l-provtn t loop ratt n no th r 1 01"rh . prtv t A .Ior.
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A Simple Guaranteed Annual Income Proposal
The national GAl program outlined here is designed to supplement
the earnings of the working poor. Its objective is to assure that
individuals with significant hours of work are always better off
working than on social assistance. The goal is to address the existing
discrimination against the working poor and to make it more at-
tractive for low-income households to leave social assistance or stay
off social assistance.
Under the proposed program. households would be guaranteed a
minimum annual income depending on the number of persons in
the family. The minimum annual income in 1993 is set somewhat
higher than the lowest provincial social assistance benefit levels in
1992. The maximum GAl benefits in 1993 would have ranged from
$5.000 for a single person to $12.000 for a couple with two or more
children (Table 11).
Table 11
GAl Benefit Schedule, 1993
Number of persons in the family
1 2 3 4 or more
Maximum GAl 5,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
Tax-back rate 50% 50% 50% 50%
Break-even point 10,000 16,000 20,000 24,000
Household income GAl benefit
0 5,000 8,000 10,000 12,000
2,000 4,000 7,000 9,000 11,000
4,000 3,000 6,000 8,000 10,000
6,000 2,000 5,000 7,000 9,000
8,000 1,000 4,000 6,000 8,000
10,000 0 3,000 5,000 7,000
12,000 0 2,000 4,000 6,000
14,000 0 1,000 3,000 5,000
16,000 0 0 2,000 4,OOG
18,000 0 0 1,000 3,000
20,000 0 0 0 2,000
22,000 0 0 0 1,000
24,000 0 0 0 0
26,000 0 0 0 0
28,000 0 0 0 0
30,000 0 0 0 0
NOT AI oonolll "" nlllollllllml I follow 1111111111001110,Iflmlllo receive the maximum
b nlllll; will 11f 1I1I1I1t III1VI 111I111111trllll1 1\ IIIIIIU or IHIII r OWO .tno GAl b n 1111I xed
hlok t 0%.
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For each dollar of income from earnings or other sources. GAl
benefits would be reduced by 50 cents (as under the federal GIS
program for older Canadians). For example. a single parent with
two children and no other source of income would have received in
1993 the maximum $10.000 that applies to this family size. The
same single parent with $12.000 of earnings would have received
$4.000 in GAlbenefits (i.e.. $10.000 minus 0.50 times $12.000). UI
benefits are treated like earnings. while income from social assis-
tance is not taxed back at all.
The GAl program would replace traditional social assistance
payments. However. the provinces could still supplement the federal
GAl program. The GAl program could be treated as the "first tier"
and individual provinces could add a "second tier" through social
assistance. For example. a province could top up the national benefits
with additional benefits for those unable or not expected to work.
Such top-up programs could work like the GAlNSprogram in On-
tario.
This is an example of a two-tier approach. such as the one
proposed by the Orange Paper in 1973 (Canada. Department of
National Health and Welfare 1973). of income support through
traditional social assistance for those not working; and income
supplementation through a GAlprogram for those working but not
having adequate income. The type of GAl employed is also consis-
tent with the concept outlined in the recent Ontario document
Turning Point (Ontario. Ministry of Community and Social Services
1993).
The maximum GAl benefits would be roughly equivalent to the
maximum social assistance benefits in several provinces. For
example. in the case of couples with two children the maximum
GAl benefits would be roughly equivalent to the maximum social
assistance benefits in Newfoundland. Nova Scotia, and New
Brunswick.
The tax-back rate is significantly lower than provincial social as-
sistance tax-back rates to provide a work incentive for social assis-
tance recipients. The working poor not on social assistance would
be faced with a 50 percent GAl tax-back rate. As discussed earlier.
the combination of higher income because of GAl and the new
tax-back rate could er ate somework disincentives among this group
of individu Is.
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However, the overall extent of work disincentives would likely be
minimal- especially taking into account that many GAl recipients
would also be likely recipients for social assistance and that the
GAl plan would make the work option more attractive relative to
social assistance.
The particular benefit structure presented here was deliberately
chosen to minimize the possibility of an overlap between GAlbenefits
and income tax payments. An increase of the minimum guaranteed
income levels, or a lowering of the tax-back rate would require a
reform of the income tax system to avoid stacking GAl tax-back
rates and income tax rates. Such a reform could be fairly involved
and costly.
Simulation Results
The 1991 Survey of Consumer Finances (1990 incomes) were used
to simulate the number of beneficiaries and the cost of the simple
GAlprogram if it were implemented in 1993. The basis of the analysis
is census family units where neither the head nor the spouse (if
present) is 65 or older.
The results of the simulation are reported in Table 12. They show
that in 1993 about 1.6 million households would have qualified for
GAl payments. The average benefit would have ranged from $2,977
for single individuals to $5,144 for families with four or more
members, with the total benefits being approximately $6.3 billion.
Since the GAlwould have replaced part of existing social assistance
payments, there would have been about $3.1 billion saved in federal
and provincial social assistance costs. As a result, the net cost of
the GAl program in 1993 would have been about $3.2 billion.
The estimates presented here are very rough. Overall, the simu-
lation results overstate the number of beneficiaries and the cost of
the GAl program, for at least two main reasons. First, about half of
octal assistance b nefits are not reported in the SCF. As a result,
th numb r of 11 ibl hous holds and the level of benefits are
ov r t t d. ond, 11 11lbl f mtly unit r assumed to receive
Ih tr AI 1 11I1c11l( 1\'1 . In r .altty, the t k -up r t would lik ly b
below 100 IWr(I(\1It,4
Table 12
Simulation of a Simple GAl Program, 1993
Persons in census family unit All
1 2 3 4 plus families
GAl incidence
All census family units (000) 2,877 2,047 1,505 2,539 8,969
Eligible census family units (000) 777 329 213 278 1,597
Incidence of GAl (%) 27% 16% 14% 11% 18%
Gross GAl cost
Eligible census family units (000) 777 329 213 278 1,597
Average GAl per census family unit ($) 2,977 4,426 5,107 5,144 3,937
Total gross GAl payments ($ million) 2,312 1,457 1,088 1,430 6,287
Net GAl cost
Family units better off with GAl (000) 548 215 147 219 1,129
Average GAl minus social assistance ($) 2,235 2,957 3,361 3,745 2,812
Total net GAl payments ($ million) 1,226 635 493 818 3,173
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NOTE The simulation results are based on the Survey of Consumer Finances 1991 (1990
incomes; census families). The estimates are crude for at least three main reasons:
(a) 1990 incomes are used to simulate the cost of the program in 1993,
(b) it is not taken into account that about 50% of social assistance benefits are not reported
in the SCF, and
(c) no allowance was made for potential work Incentive or disincentive effects.
On balance, the above simulation results most likely overstate the potential number of
eligible households and the net cost of the program.
Deficit-Neutral Financing
Despite all the uncertainties of the cost simulation, there is little
doubt that the cost of implementing a GAl is substantial. In the
current fiscal environment, the only realistic way to finance a GAl
would be by realizing savings elsewhere in the income security
system.
Part of the federal costs of implementing a GAl plan could be
offset by reducing payments to the provinces under CAP. The amount
of reduction could reflect the amount of savings accruing to provin-
cial social assistance programs because of the introduction of the
GAl first tier.
The net federal cost of the GAl plan outlined here could be as
high as $3.2 billion. D flcit-n utral financing would require chan-
in xi tmg f d r 1in om urtty progr ms. Th VI pro~r m
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Table 13
Cost Savings from Changes in UI in 1993-94
Based on Recommendations by the Macdonald Commission
UI Change Expected Savings
Reducing the benefit rate for all types of UI benefits from
the current 57% to 50% $2.6 billion
Increasing the minimum entrance requirement to 20 weeks $3.0 billion
Paying a maximum of one week of benefits for each week
of insured employment $1.7 billion
Combine savings in regular benefits as a result
of all above changes $6.7 billion
Savings as a percentage of total regular benefits 40%
NOTe Calculations are based on rough assumptions applied to statistics contained in the Statistics
Canada publication "Unemployment Insurance stanstlcs" (Catalogue 73-001).
provides the opportunity for the largest savings. According to the
1993-94 Estimates, the cost ofUI is expected to be $20.8 billion, of
which regular benefits will account for $16.5 billion.
Implementing some of the recommendations of the Macdonald
Commission, discussed above, could result in $6.5 billion of savings,
or about 40 percent of the total UIbenefits (Table 13).These savings
would be more than enough to finance the GAl plan outlined here.
In fact, such savings could finance a more ambitious GAl plan.
They could also finance additional employability improvement
programs, such as classroom training, apprenticeship training, and
work experience initiatives. (Note: Some parts of these cuts have
been implemented since this paper was written; the savings would
be less than those indicated in Table 13.)
Alternative GAl Implementation Mechanisms
Tb m h d ! of b n fit and tax-back rates could be
imp! m nt d through uti rns Ilv m. h nt m . In hoosm th most
npproprltl('v('lll('k,llIc'COll I k-r 1110111->r pr .. nt dbyth ~ llowtng
que 11011 Illt •• Ill,' I ,1~('1l Intn 1("('011111:
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• Will the GAl reach most of the eligible population? /What
will the take-up rate be?
• Will it be simple and economical to administer?
• Howwill the recipients respond to changes in their income
level?
• Willadjustments for underpayments and. more importantly.
overpayments be necessary?
A national GAl plan could be implemented integrated with the
social assistance system. the ur system. or the tax credit system.
Integration with the Social Assistance System - Under this op-
tion. CAP could fund 100 percent of the national GAlplan. subject
to certain national conditions. Other social assistance programs
could continue to receive federal funding under CAPbut at lower
matching rates.
With this delivery mechanism. benefits could be very responsive
to short-term changes in the income position of the recipient. On
the other hand. the mechanism has several disadvantages. The
stigma often associated with social assistance could become attached
to the benefits and social assistance does not reach a large part of
the low-income population. namely the working poor.
Integration with the UI System - Canada Employment Centres
(CECs)could administer a GAlplan as an extension of the or system.
The provinces could top-up benefits. especially for the unemployable
or those not expected to work. These top-ups could work like the
Ontario GAlNStop-up to the federal Guaranteed Income Supplement
for the older population. The provinces would continue to be
responsible for short-term/emergency assistance and for the delivery
of social services.
There would be less stigma attached to it than there would be to
the social assistance mechanism and. consequently. there would
be a relatively higher take-up rate. Also. this mechanism would be
more appropriate for reaching out beyond the traditional social as-
sistance clientele. As well. if the GAlplan were visibly link to the or
fund. it might get business-labour support. especially if business
and labour wanted to influence how the fund is used. This could
occur. for example. through the Canadian Labour For Dev lopm nt
Board.
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On the other hand, bringing social assistance recipients within
the UI system could tempt the government to finance the GAlthrough
employer and employee UI premiums. This could discourage
employers from creating jobs and it would be a regressive way of
financing the GAl program.
Integration with the Tax Credit System - A GAl plan could be
administered in the form of a refundable tax credit program such
as the federal Child Benefit. Although this option would likely achieve
the highest take-up rate and lowest stigma, it would require a more
elaborate administrative design than current refundable tax credit
programs. Because of its scale, it would be important to make the
GAl tax credit more responsive to short-term changes in household
income than is the case with existing refundable tax credits.
The main conclusion arising from this examination of GAl op-
tions is that a GAl program is feasible. The cost of the example
presented here, although substantial, would still be but a fraction
of the potential savings from changes to the UI program along the
lines proposed by the Macdonald Commission. (These savings have
been significantly reduced by recent UI cuts, but there would still
be substantial savtngs.)
Using UI funds to reinforce work incentives is a critical element
in the overall strategy of shifting from passive income support to
active measures to improve employability. Work incentives and trai-
ning are necessary complements to any serious attempt to break
the cycle of recurrent reliance on social assistance. Such a major
change in the income security system would require cooperation
between federal and provincial governments. It would also benefit
from business and labour support.
Federal-Provincial-Private Sector Cooperation
The successful implementation of a GAl would require first and
foremost the close cooperation of the federal and provincial
ov rnm nt . A ertatn d gree of harmonization of benefit rates
nd tax-ba k r t s would b r qulr d to a ure that the main
01~ .rtvc of El Al - III cltmtnatton of th w It r trap - 1 not
undr rmtne 11 111(' I uk or coopcrnuou hctwcc n th two 1 .vcl of
gOV('.'." 11('1\t •
• poverty is a moving target and a program to contain the
number of social assistance recipients must address both
those currently receiving assistance and low-wage earners,
who are at risk of becoming recipients; and
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A clear distinction of responsibilities would be a very effective
way to achieve the required harmonization. For example, the federal
government could be responsible for the first tier and the provinces
could be responsible for short-term assistance and top-ups to the
federal program. The role ofbusiness and labour would also be very
important, at least in the initial phase of implementation.
Cooperation among governments, business, labour, and equity
groups would be very critical for the success of a GAl program. In
the past, many interesting proposals have been put forward but
they have always encountered difficulties when federal-provincial
negotiations got under way. With the increased assertiveness of
business and labour, the issue of cooperation becomes even more
critical. A realistic way to move ahead in this area would involve a
broad consultation exercise, similar to the one orchestrated by the
Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre following the
launching of the Labour Force Development Strategy in 1988.
An overhaul of the income security system is long overdue. This
study indicates that a GAlcould be the centrepiece of such a reform.
Two key observations from this study which strengthen the case
for a GAl program are
• only a small percentage of the low-income population is
truly destitute with no opportunity to achieve some level of
self-sufficiency.
The GAlprogram described in the study could be implemented in
a number ofways and financed from savings achieved through chan-
ges in existing programs. (While existing programs have been cut
back since this paper was written, and the details of the changes
required to finance a 01 would be different, the basic point that a
GAlcould be financed through savings in existing programs remains
valid.) It could encourage self-sufficiency among social assistance
reciptents and make income transfers more equitable with respect
to the working poor. Und r th urr nt y t ID th workin poor
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receive very limited support. This is not equitable and creates work
disincentives by encouraging low-income earners to move to social
assistance rather than to work to become self-sufficient.
Studies, primarily V.S. studies based on static analyses, of the
impact of a GAl plan on work incentives have indicated a negative
effect among the working poor. However, the effect tends to be small
and there are reasons to believe a GAlprogram would have a smaller
effect on work incentives in the Canadian labour force. Given the
employment volatility of the social assistance population, a GAlplan
may have a long-term positive effect on work incentives among the
working poor.
Work incentives and training are necessary complements to any
serious attempt to break the cycle of recurrent reliance on social
assistance. The introduction of a GAlplan could play a critical role
in facilitating the shift from passive income support to active
measures to improve the employability of both social assistance
recipients and the working poor.
Notes
1. Often those conducting poverty studies base their analysis on the
economic family defmition rather than the census family definition.
The economic family defmition includes all related individuals living
in the same dwelling. The census family definition was chosen here
because it is more appropriate for implementing a GAl in the form of
a refundable tax credit, like the Child Benefit program.
2. A low tax-back rate means that variation in income from year to year
leads to small changes in benefits. Consequently, there is no need for
major reconciliation of payments.
3. The above descrtption of the substitution effect is an over-Simplifi-
cation. A more accurate description involves advanced economic
concepts such as "indifference curves" and "utility maximization." For
a more technical treatment of the topic. see Gunderson and Riddell
(1988).
4. Inter ling In this r pect is the experience of Quebec with respect to
It APP RT ,nrnlngR uppl m nt. The take-up rate for the program
I ('011 lell ihly lowI" Ih In I p r nt,
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